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Fixing Baker Botts: Contractual Provisions Granting an Exception to the American Rule in 
Bankruptcy 
 
Sarah Jones* 
 
I.      Introduction 
Two law firms have sought the Delaware Bankruptcy Court’s approval under § 328 of the 
Bankruptcy Code for contractual provisions in engagement letters granting attorneys fees for 
successfully defended fee applications.1  The reason for such provisions takes root from the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Baker Botts v. Asarco.2  In the case Baker Botts, the petitioner had 
represented ASARCO, a corporation with over $10 billion in debt, in bankruptcy, including 
prosecuting ASARCO’s parent company, Grupo Mexico, for fraudulent transfer.3  Baker Botts 
accomplished what the trial court judge proclaimed “the most successful Chapter 11 of any 
magnitude in the history of the [Bankruptcy] Code.”4  Baker Botts obtained a judgment against 
Grupo Mexico worth over $7 billion and, four years after filing bankruptcy, ASARCO found itself 
“with $1.4 billion in cash, little debt, and resolution of its environmental liabilities.”5  Baker Botts 
filed an application requesting fees for its services under section 330 of the Bankruptcy Code.6 
After the successful reorganization, ASARCO fell back into the control of Grupo Mexico, 
the parent company ASARCO had sued in Baker Botts v. ASARCO, for the $7 billion. The 
reorganized ASARCO then began a “scorched earth campaign” to object to Baker Botts’ fee 
                                                     
* J.D. Candidate, 2017, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., 2013, Syracuse University.  Thank you to Professor 
Stephen J. Lubben for his help and guidance throughout the writing of this Comment.  Thank you also to my friends, 
family, and fellow editors.  
1 Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158 (2015).  
2 In Re Northshore Mainland Services, Inc. No. 15-11402-KJC (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 14, 2015); In Re Boomerang 
Tube, LLC, No. 15-11247-MFW, (Bankr. D. Del. June 19, 2015). 
3 In re ASARCO LLC, No. 05-21207, 2011 WL 2974957, at *4 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. July 20, 2011), aff'd in part, rev'd 
in part and remanded, 477 B.R. 661 (S.D. Tex. 2012). 
4 Id. (“Creditors were expected to receive cents on the dollar, if anything, because ASARCO's assets were severely 
depleted and the claims against it were extraordinarily high.”). 
5 Id. 
6 In re ASARCO LLC, No. 05-21207, 2011 WL 2974957, at *4 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. July 20, 2011). 
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applications.7  After Baker Botts successfully defended itself against these objections, which the 
trial court held as meritless,8 Baker Botts requested compensation for its defense costs by an 
exception to the American Rule, a Bankruptcy custom accepted in the majority of jurisdictions.9  
The district court approved the fees, but the Fifth Circuit and Supreme Court denied them on 
appeal.10  The Supreme Court declared that section 330 of the Bankruptcy Code did not include 
express language indicating an exception to the American Rule for bankruptcy attorneys; therefore, 
bankruptcy attorneys could not collect attorney’s fees for successfully defending fee 
applications.11  
The majority of courts had previously reasoned that rewarding fees for successfully 
defending fee applications furthered the “market based” approach Congress adopted as the policy 
of section 330: to compensate bankruptcy professionals in parity with their non-bankruptcy 
counterparts.12  Unlike in ordinary corporate contexts, under Chapter 11 bankruptcy law, a number 
of parties can object to an attorney’s compensation.13  Each party’s objection puts the bankruptcy 
attorney in the predicament of facing one of two losses: either cutting the fees or incurring the cost 
of defending the fee application.14  Despite the fact that bankruptcy professionals are fairly 
                                                     
7 Brief for Petitioners, 35–36m Baker Botts L.L.P. v. Asarco LLC, 2014 WL 6845689 (2014).  
8 See id. 
9 Timothy S. Springer, Damned if You Do, Damned if You Don’t – Current Issues for Professionals Seeking 
Compensation in Bankruptcy Cases Under 11 U.S.C. § 330, 87 AM. BANKR. L.J. 525, 539 (2013). 
10 Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158 (2015).  
11 Id. at 2164 (“We have recognized departures from the American Rule only in ‘specific and explicit provisions for 
the allowance of attorneys' fees under selected statutes’…[and] congress did not expressly depart from the American 
Rule to permit compensation for fee-defense litigation by professionals hired to assist trustees in bankruptcy 
proceedings.”) (citing Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 260 (1975)).  
12 3-330 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY P 330.LH (“Attorneys and other professionals serving in a bankruptcy case are to 
be compensated at the same rate that would be used to compensate them for performing comparable services in 
nonbankruptcy cases.”).  See Springer, supra note 9, at 539 (“The courts supporting the success rule follow similar 
policy arguments to those pre-dating the 1994 Amendments-namely, the equal pay concept that not granting defense 
costs would "dilute fee awards" below compensation available to attorneys generally.”).  
13 11 U.S.C.A. § 1109 (2005) (“A party in interest, including the debtor, the trustee, a creditors' committee, an equity 
security holders' committee, a creditor, an equity security holder, or any indenture trustee, may raise [a fee 
objection.]”).  
14 Springer, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.; Brief for Amici Curiae Bankruptcy Law Scholars in Support 
of Petitioners, Baker Botts L.L.P. v. Asarco LLC, 3, 2014 WL 7145500 (2014) (“Most lawyers, of course, are not in 
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compensated,15 fee objections are frequently litigated.16  Bankruptcy courts, wary that defense 
costs would dilute fee compensation below the market rate, allowed attorney compensation for 
successfully defending applications.17  Under the majority system, creditors and debtors were 
incentivized to limit objections to those with merit and professionals were compensated in a 
manner that furthered the policy of the statute.18  
This Comment argues that Baker Botts does not destroy market driven compensation the 
way some have feared.19  The American Rule has two exceptions: by contractual provision and by 
statute.20  This note argues that while Baker Botts may have denied the first option under section 
330,21 the holding still leaves bankruptcy professionals another road to market rate compensation: 
contractual provisions in retention agreements made under section 328.22  While some have argued 
that other methods are sufficient to alleviate concerns regarding fee dilution,23 this Comment will 
                                                     
the position of having to litigate the reasonableness of their fees with anyone other than the client that engaged them, 
much less multiple adversaries of that client.”).  
15 See Stephen Lubben, The Direct Costs of Corporate Reorganization: An Empirical Examination of Professional 
Fees in Large Chapter 11 Cases, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 509, 512 (2000) (“Chapter 11 is substantially less expensive 
than other significant corporate transactions.”). 
16 Amicus Curiae Brief of the State Bar of Texas Bankruptcy Law Section in Support of Petitioners, Baker Botts L.L.P. 
v. Asarco LLC, 19, 2014 WL 7145502 (2014) (citing Presentation of the Landmark ABI Fee Study: Conclusions and 
Ramifications 8, ¶¶ 15-16 (American Bankruptcy Institute, Winter Leadership Conference 2007); Stephen J. Lubben 
(Reporter), Chapter 11 Professional Fee Study 35 (American Bankruptcy Institute, 2007)).  
17 See Springer, supra note 9. 
18 Id. 
19 David Bury, 20 Questions about Baker Botts v. ASARCO & “Fee-Defense” Costs – Part 2, PLAN PROPONENT, (July 
14, 2015), http://www.planproponent.com/20-questions-about-baker-botts-v-asarco-fee-defense-costs-part-2/. 
20 Baker Botts, 135 S. Ct. at 2164 (“‘Each litigant pays his own attorney's fees, win or lose, unless a statute or contract 
provides otherwise.’”) (emphasis added) (quoting Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 252–53 
(2010)).  
21 Id. at 2169.  
22 See In Re Northshore Mainland Services, Inc. No. 15-11402-KJC (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 14, 2015); In Re Boomerang 
Tube, LLC, No. 15-11247-MFW, (Bankr. D. Del. June 19, 2015); Stephen J. Lubben, Problems With the Supreme 
Court’s Ruling on Fees, N, Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Sept. 4, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/04/business/dealbook/problems-with-supreme-courts-ruling-on-fees.html; Jeffrey 
S. Sabin, The Baker Botts v. Asarco Fallout Has Begun, LAW360 (Sept. 1, 2015, 12:49 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/697291/the-baker-botts-v-asarco-fallout-has-begun.  
23 See supra Sec. C.  
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demonstrate that contractual provisions are the only sufficient method to fulfill congressional 
policy and maintain the success of chapter 11 bankruptcy. 
This note will begin in Part II by summarizing section 330’s legislative history and policy, 
and the judicial history of defending fee applications.  Next, it will explain the Baker Botts ruling 
and the American Rule.  Part III will argue why court-approved defense fee provisions under 
section 328 comply with Baker Botts and why such provisions are necessary under the Code’s 
market-based policy.  Fee defense provisions not only comply with section 328, but they also are 
the most suitable among all of the options raised to compensate bankruptcy professionals on par 
with their non-bankruptcy counterparts.  Finally, applying the factors applied to retention 
agreements drafted under section 328, courts should find fees for defense of fee provisions 
reasonable.  
II. From the Spirit of the Economy to the Market Based Approach: The Evolution of 
Compensation 
 
Two schools of thought, the market based and the spirit of the economy, chronicle 
bankruptcy law’s philosophy.24  The current Bankruptcy Code employs the market-based 
approach.25  Under this framework, a bankruptcy attorney is paid in parity with her non-bankruptcy 
counterparts since she is compensated at the same rate as an attorney of comparable skill, 
reputation, and experience.26  The Bankruptcy Act governed bankruptcy law until the Bankruptcy 
Code was enacted in 1978.27  Under the Bankruptcy Act, courts set attorneys fees under the spirit 
of economy approach.28  The spirit of the economy’s priority was to protect the funds of the 
                                                     
24 3-330 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY P 330.LH. 
25 Id. 
26 Norman v. Hous. Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 1988); see id. 
27 3-330 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY P 330.LH. 
28 Id.  
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estate.29  As a result, attorney fees were severely limited to the least reasonable,30 if not the lowest 
minimum,31 possible.  
 While the spirit of the economy approach was intended to protect the estate, lawmakers 
grew concerned that the policy caused the opposite effect.32  If bankruptcy professionals were paid 
less than their non-bankruptcy counterparts, it was likely that skilled attorneys were incentivized 
to practice elsewhere.33  To illustrate the pay gap, bankruptcy attorneys’ fees nearly doubled after 
1978 in order meet the market-based approach.34 Unlike the prominent and strategic role 
bankruptcy practice holds today, bankruptcy professionals were locked out of the corporate world, 
and elite firms shunned bankruptcy practice as undignified work.35  Congress, wary that the the 
future of the practice would only “be occupied by those who could not find other work and those 
who practice bankruptcy law only occasionally almost as a public service,” decided to implement 
the market based approach under section 330.36 
In drafting section 330, the legislature stated that “[a]ttorneys . . . serving in a bankruptcy 
case are to be compensated at the same rate that would be used to compensate them for performing 
                                                     
29 Id.  
30 Id.; see, e.g. Jacobowitz v. Double Seven Corp., 378 F.2d 405, 408 (9th Cir. 1967) (setting attorney fees “at the 
lower end of the spectrum for reasonableness”). 
31 3-330 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY P 330.LH.; see, e.g. In re Lng, 127 F. 755, 757 (W.D. Tex. 1904) (reducing fees 
to the “lowest minimum possible”). 
32 H.R. REP. 95-595, 30, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6286; 24 Cong. Rec. H11,091-2 (Sept. 28, 1978); reprinted in 
App. Pt. 4(f)(i) infra; 124 Cong. Rec. S17,408 (Oct. 6, 1978), reprinted in App. Pt. 4(f)(iii) infra. 
33 Id.  
34 Elliot D. Lee, “Bankruptcy Lawyers Gain Status, Wider Role in Corporate Strategy,” WALL ST. J., July 9, 1987, at 
31. 
35 Id.; KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS 152 (1997) (“Indeed, most professionals wish to avoid a return to 
the time when bankruptcy law practice was not well regarded and was considered by most firms as unseemly, like 
family law or criminal law. The quality and professionalism of the bankruptcy bar have risen since then.”) (citing 
Lynn M. LoPucki, “The Demographics of Bankruptcy Practice,” 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 289 (1989)). 
36 11 U.S.C.A. § 330 (1978); H.R. REP. 95-595, 30, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6286; see also 124 Cong. Rec. 32, 394 
(1978) (“[T]he policy of [the section] is to compensate attorneys and other professionals serving in a case under title 
11 at the same rate as the attorney or other professional would be compensated for performing comparable 
services[.]”); 3-330 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY P 330.LH; Lee, supra note 34, at 31 ("We intended to make it easier 
for companies to file for reorganization and easier for the bankruptcy bar to attract better-qualified lawyers[.]") (Frank 
R. Kennedy) (executive director of the federal commission that recommended most of the changes adopted in the 
1978 Act).  
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comparable services in non-bankruptcy cases.”37  The new market-based approach, combined with 
the other changes of the Code, such as increased accessibility to bankruptcy protection, allowed 
bankruptcy professionals to gain status and a wider role in corporate decisionmaking.38  They 
became corporations’ special advisors and strategists for “life or death situation[s].”39  By 1987, 
bankruptcy attorneys had shed their “dirty collar” reputation and joined some of the nation’s most 
elite law firms.40  The new system has proven to be fruitful for debtors, creditors, and attorneys 
alike, evidenced by the fact that modern bankruptcy attorneys have orchestrated some of the most 
successful reorganizations in bankruptcy’s history.41  
The Bankruptcy Code and section 330 have been modified over time, but the market-based 
approach has continued to be documented within its statutes.42  The 1978 version of section 330(a) 
stated that compensation is “based on the nature, the extent, and the value of such services, the 
time spent on such services, and the cost of comparable services other than in a case under [the 
Code].”43  In 1994, the legislature also added the Johnson factors to aid courts in determining 
reasonable compensation, finalizing section 330(a) to the version it is today.44  The Johnson 
Factors entail: (a) time spent on services; (b) rates charged for such services; (c) whether the 
                                                     
37 3-330 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY P 330.LH; see also 124 Cong. Rec. 32, 394 (1978) (“[T]he policy of [the section] 
is to compensate attorneys and other professionals serving in a case under title 11 at the same rate as the attorney or 
other professional would be compensated for performing comparable services[.]”).   
38 Lee, supra note 34, at 31; see also Richard I. Aaron, The Bankruptcy Bench, 89 COM. L.J. 47, 47 (1984) (“Insolvency 
practice enjoys a prestige marked by contrast to that of a few years ago.  Firms which disdained the work now eagerly 
seek the business.”). 
39 Lee, supra note 34, at 31. 
40 Lee, supra note 34, at 31; GROSS, supra note 35, at 152. 
41 Stewart Bishop, Lehman Brothers Creditors Getting $2.2B Payout, LAW360, (Feb. 19, 2015, 6:42 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/623015/lehman-brothers-creditors-getting-2-2b-payout; Trefis Team, Relaunching 
American Airlines's Coverage: Exiting Bankruptcy Into A Successful Turnaround Has Added Value, FORBES (May 
12, 2014, 01:36 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2014/05/12/relaunching-american-airliness-
coverage-exiting-bankruptcy-into-a-successful-turnaround-has-added-value/#2f8814104b81; see also In re 
ASARCO LLC, No. 05-21207, 2011 WL 2974957, at *4 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. July 20, 2011) (calling the case “the 
most successful Chapter 11 of any magnitude in the history of the [Bankruptcy] Code.”). 
42 3-330 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY P 330.LH. 
43 11 U.S.C. § 330(a) (1978) (emphasis added). 
44 3-330 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY P 330.LH. 
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services were necessary or beneficial to the case at the time they were rendered; (d) whether the 
services were completed within a reasonable period of time given the importance, complexity, and 
nature of the problem; (e) whether the person has bankruptcy skills and experience; and (f) 
“whether the compensation is reasonable based on the customary compensation charged by 
comparably skilled practitioners in cases other than cases under this title.”45  
A. Actual and Necessary Services 
Under section 330, attorneys may receive compensation for “actual, necessary services” 
that are found reasonable under the Johnson Factors.46  Actual and necessary services are “those 
services that aid the professional's client in fulfilling its duties under the Code.”47  For example, if 
an attorney represents the committee, his services may aid the client in investigating the debtor’s 
conditions and plans, formulating plans, and other duties proscribed under the Code.48  An attorney 
representing the trustee may aid the client in investigating the financial affairs of the debtor, 
monitoring the business if it is still in operation, and ensuring the debtor performs all duties 
proscribed under the Code.49  While it comported with common sense that assisting clients in their 
duties classified as “actual, necessary” services payable under section 330, other services, such as 
preparing fee applications or defending such fee applications, were frequently disputed.50  
A fee application is a thorough statement of a bankruptcy attorney’s rates and time spent 
on services for a given case.51  Courts were split on whether preparing fee applications, no less 
                                                     
45 11 U.S.C. § 330 (1994) (emphasis added). 
46 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)(A) (1994). 
47 In re Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc., 140 B.R. 482, 485 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992). 
48 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c) (1984). 
49 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2010).  
50 See, e.g. In re Nucorp Energy, Inc., 764 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1985) (allowing compensation for preparing and 
defending fee applications); In re Jessee, 77 B.R. 59 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1987) (declining to award compensation for 
defending fee applications); In re Courson, 138 B.R. 928 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1992) (declining to allow compensation 
for preparing and defending fee applications).  
51 See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2016(a). 
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defending such applications, were necessary services under section 330.52  Applications require a 
great deal of care and detail because the attorney must prove that the compensation is a fair market 
rate.53  In the 1994 amendment. Congress partially addressed these issues by adding subsection 
(a)(6) to 330, which orders that “compensation awarded for the preparation of a fee application 
[shall] be based on the level and skill reasonably required to prepare the application.”54  This 
provision demonstrated that preparing fee applications was a necessary service for the purposes of 
the statute, but remained silent as to the defense of such fee applications.55 
Courts were split as to whether defending fee application were actual and necessary 
services under section 330.56  The majority, led by the Ninth Circuit, held that such litigation fees 
should be payable if the attorney was successful in defending the fee application.57  The minority 
held that the estate should never pay for defense fees.58  
B. The Majority Approach 
                                                     
52 See In re Nucorp Energy, Inc., 764 F.2d 655 (allowing compensation for preparing and defending fee applications); 
In re Jessee, 77 B.R. 59 (declining to award compensation for defending fee applications); In re Courson, 138 B.R. 
928 (declining to allow compensation for preparing and defending fee applications). 
53 See Bankruptcy Fee Applications: Compensable Service or Cost of Doing Business, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 1327, 
1327 n. 7 (1990); see also Butenas, Establishing Attorney's Fees Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 37 Bus. Law. 77, 
83 (1981) (advising attorneys to extensively document every hour of work and to be prepared that compensation and 
services may be objected).  
54 11 U.S.C. §330(a)(6) (1994); GRANT W. NEWTON, BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY ACCOUNTING, PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE 454 (7th ed., Volume 1, 2009). 
55 See generally 11 U.S.C. §330 (1994). 
56 Springer, supra note 9, at 535, n. 69–70 (citing In re Manoa Fin., 853 F.2d 687, 692 (9th Cir. 1987) (allowing 
compensation); Frazin v. Haynes & Boone, LLP (In re Frazin), 413 B.R. 378, 402–03 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2009) 
(denying compensation), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, and remanded, 723 F.3d 313 (5th Cir. 2013) 
(denying compensation); In re Hers Cosmetics Corp., 114 B.R. 240, 244 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990) (allowing 
compensation); In re DN Assocs., 165 B.R. 344, 354–55 (Bankr. D. Me. 1994) (denying compensation); Boyd v. 
Engman, 404 B.R. 467, 483 (W.D. Mich. 2009) (allowing compensation); In re Teraforce Tech. Corp., 347 B.R. 838, 
866-67 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006) (denying compensation); In re JNS Aviation, LLC, No. 04-21055-RLJ-7, 2009 WL 
80202, at *9 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2009) (denying compensation); ASARCO LLC v. Baker Botts, L.L.P. (In re 
ASARCO LLC), 477 B.R. 661, 675 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (allowing compensation); Nunley v. Jessee, 92 B.R. 152, 154 
(W.D. Va. 1988) (allowing compensation)).  
57 Id.  
58 Id.  
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Prior to Baker Botts,59 the majority of courts held that successfully defending fee 
applications were actual and necessary services under section 330.60  The reasoning behind the 
majority view can be traced to opinions long before the 1994 amendment to the code, such as In 
re Nucorp Energy.61  Following the 1994 amendment, courts determined that, as a matter of 
fairness and in furtherance of section 330’s market-based policy, successful defense costs were 
necessary to the bankruptcy system as a whole.62 
In 1985, In re Nucorp set forth the majority’s policy perspective regarding defense fees.63 
The Ninth Circuit first determined which services are comparable to bankruptcy counsels’ for 
purposes of the statute.64  If the services were comparable to services with fees expressly provided 
for by statute, the compensation should have been allowed.65  For policy reasons, statutory fee 
award provisions are read to approve compensation for defending fees.  However, if the services 
were comparable to situations in which the attorneys benefit the entire class of litigants through a 
common fund, then compensation would not be allowed under the “fund doctrine.”66  
The court found that, given the special nature of the source of fees in bankruptcy, 
bankruptcy was not directly comparable to either of the categories.67  However, the policies 
underlying bankruptcy and other statutory fee provisions were so similar that compensation was 
fairly warranted.68  The issue with the common fund comparison was the fact that, while attorney 
                                                     
59 Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158 (2015).  
60 See Springer, supra note 9, at 535.  
61 764 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1985). 
62 Springer, supra note 56, at 538–41. 
63 See In re Smith, 305 F.3d 1078, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing In Re Nucorp, 764 F.2d at 660–61). 
64 In re Nucorp Energy, Inc., 764 F.2d 655, 655–61 (9th Cir. 1985). 
65 Id. at 659–61. 
66 Id. at 661 (citing Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 257 (1975); City of Detroit v. 
Grinnell Corp., 560 F.2d 1094, 1098 (2d Cir. 1977); Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard 
Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102, 110 (3d Cir. 1976) (en banc)). 
67 Id. at 662. 
68 Id.  
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fees are derived from the common pool of the estate, this was not a common fund created by the 
attorney and benefiting the entire class.  The estate existed as the source of compensation to begin 
with.  While the source of fees in bankruptcy cases is not the same as in statutory fee cases either, 
the underlying policy concerns are similar.  Bankruptcy and other statutory fee provisions share 
two common policies: maintaining fair market rates for services, which may be affected by 
dilution, and encouraging attorneys to practice in the field, which may be affected by decreased 
rates.  Dilution is the concern that “the attorney’s effective rate for all the hours expended on the 
case will be correspondingly decreased.”69  The court reasoned, if attorney fees are diluted, then 
attorneys will not take bankruptcy cases, thus defeating the Code’s goal to encourage 
representation.70  
The courts that followed In Re Nucrop’s reasoning sought to protect bankruptcy fees, and 
thus protect the quality of bankruptcy work, by counteracting the fee dilution created by fee 
objections.71  Despite the fact that bankruptcy professionals are fairly compensated,72 fee 
objections are frequently litigated.73  Every time a party objects, the bankruptcy attorney is forced 
to either cut her fees or incur the cost of defending a fee application; either way her fees are 
effectively diluted.74  To counteract fee dilution, the majority of bankruptcy courts awarded 
                                                     
69 Id. at 660 (citing Prandini v. Nat'l Tea Co., 585 F.2d 47, 53 (3d Cir. 1978)).  
70 Id.  
71 In re Nucorp Energy, Inc., 764 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1985). 
72 Stephen Lubben, The Direct Costs of Corporate Reorganization: An Empirical Examination of Professional Fees 
in Large Chapter 11 Cases, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 509, 512 (2000) (“Chapter 11 is substantially less expensive than 
other significant corporate transactions.”). 
73 Amicus Curiae Brief of the State Bar of Texas Bankruptcy Law Section in Support of Petitioners, 19, Baker Botts 
L.L.P. v. Asarco LLC, 2014 WL 7145502 (2014) (citing Presentation of the Landmark ABI Fee Study: Conclusions 
and Ramifications 8, ¶¶ 15–16 (American Bankruptcy Institute, Winter Leadership Conference 2007); Stephen J. 
Lubben (Reporter), Chapter 11 Professional Fee Study 35 (American Bankruptcy Institute, 2007)).   
74 Springer, supra note 56; Brief for Amici Curiae Bankruptcy Law Scholars in Support of Petitioners, Baker Botts 
L.L.P. v. Asarco LLC, 3, 2014 WL 7145500 (2014) (“Most lawyers, of course, are not in the position of having to 
litigate the reasonableness of their fees with anyone other than the client that engaged them, much less multiple 
adversaries of that client.”). 
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attorneys compensation for successfully defending applications.75  Under such a system, creditors 
and debtors were incentivized to limit objections to those with merit, and professionals were 
compensated in a manner that furthered the policy of the statute.76   
The Ninth Circuit further articulated the majority approach in 2002.77  In Re Smith held 
that a court did not err in err in granting attorneys fees for successfully defending a fee 
application.78  The court held that the express language of section 330 did not prohibit granting 
such attorneys fees, and granting compensation for defense fees would in fact comport with section 
330’s requirements.79  The court recognized that if it were to deny the plaintiff “reasonable 
compensation for successfully defending its fee awards would dilute its compensation for ‘actual 
and necessary services.’”80  Thus, for the purposes of section 330(a), the defense fees were 
necessary to the bankruptcy system as a whole, and consequentially to the case at hand.81  Some 
courts grew concerned that compensation would encourage meritless fee requests and subsequent 
litigation fees when such requests were objected.82  However, because the In Re Smith holding was 
limited to successful fee defenses, the Ninth Circuit held that meritless fee requests would not be 
an issue.83 
B. Baker Botts and the American Rule 
In 2015, the Supreme Court overruled the majority approach by holding that, due the 
American Rule, section 330 did not recognize defense fees.  The American Rule is the “bedrock 
                                                     
75 See Springer, supra note 56, at 539. 
76 See Springer supra note 56, at 539–40.  
77 Smith v. Edwards & Hale, Ltd. (In re Smith), 317 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2002), abrogated on other grounds by Lamie 
v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 531–39 (2004). 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 929.  
81 Id.  
82 In re Riverside-Linden Inv. Co., 945 F.2d 320, 323 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting In re Riverside-Linden Inv. Co., 111 
B.R. 298, 301 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1990)). 
83 Id. 
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principle” which requires that: “‘[e]ach litigant pays his own attorney’s fees, win or lose, unless a 
statute or contract provides otherwise.’”84  In the case, Baker Botts did not have a contract 
expressly granting defense fees, but applied for the court to approve its fees under section 330.  
The Court took a textualist approach: Congress included no express provision for bankruptcy fees 
in section 330, such as it had done for preparing fee applications, therefore no exception could be 
inferred.85  In dicta, the Court questioned the market-based policy supporting defense fees, but 
ultimately held that even if the decision would “‘undercut a basic objective of the statute,’” the 
absence of express language ruled the day.86  An array of bankruptcy experts, including scholars, 
judges, neutral fee examiners, and professional organizations, supported Baker Botts as Amici 
Curiae.87  They all agreed that, based on the market-based approach, denying compensation for fee 
applications would be an unfit dilution of fees below the general market value.88 
 In Baker Botts, the Supreme Court declined to follow the majority rule.  Applying the 
American Rule to Section 330, the Court determined that, because section 330 did not contain an 
express provision granting defense fees, such fees may not be granted.89  The Court held that 
defense fees are not statutorily granted under section 330 of the Bankruptcy Code, and thus do not 
fall within the express statute or contract exception to the American Rule.90  The court reasoned 
                                                     
84 Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2164 (2015) (quoting Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. 
Co., 560 U. S. 242, 252–53 (2010)). 
85 Id. at 2169. 
86 Id.; see also Stephen J. Lubben, Problems With the Supreme Court’s Ruling on Fees, N. Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK 
(Sept. 4, 2015, time?), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/04/business/dealbook/problems-with-supreme-courts-
ruling-on-fees.html (“[T]he opinion does suggest that the Supreme Court does not really understand the dynamics of 
large Chapter 11 cases.”). 
87 Brief for Neutral Fee Examiners in Support of Petitioners, Baker Botts, 2014 WL 6845689 (2014); Brief For 
Amici Curiae Bankruptcy Law Scholars in Support of Petitioners, Baker Botts, 2014 WL 6845689; Brief for Former 
Bankruptcy Judges Leif M. Clark and Judith K. Fitzgerald as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Baker Botts, 
2014 WL 7166533; Amicus Curiae Brief of the State Bar of Texas Bankruptcy Law Section in Support of 
Petitioners, Baker Botts, 2014 WL 7145502. 
88 Id. 
89 Baker Botts, 135 S. Ct. at 2169. 
90 Id.   
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that under the American Rule, “‘[e]ach litigant pays his own attorney’s fees, win or lose, unless a 
statute or contract provides otherwise.’”91  Baker Botts, supported by a lengthy list of amici curiae 
including bankruptcy scholars, judges, neutral fee examiners, and professional organizations, 
argued that the policy and purpose of the current Bankruptcy Code is to compensate bankruptcy 
attorneys on par with other attorneys performing comparable services, and that such a ruling would 
dilute bankruptcy attorneys’ fees below the general market value.92  The Court, emphasizing its 
strict adherence to the traditional application of the American Rule, ruled that section 330 does not 
create an express exception to the American Rule, thus the defense awards would not be granted 
“even if doing so [would] . . . ‘undercut a basic objective of the statute.’”93  
III. Court Approved Fee Defense Provisions Under Section 328 
A number of bankruptcy practices have responded to Baker Botts by incorporating fee 
defense provisions in their retention agreements with creditors and debtors alike.94  Under the 
Bankruptcy Code, professionals may make fee requests with the court quantum meruit at the end 
of the case under section 330, or they may alternatively have the court preapprove retention 
agreements under an entirely separate section, section 328.95  Firms make the argument that, while 
                                                     
91 Id. at 2164 (quoting Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U. S. 242, 252–53 (2010). 
92 Brief for Petitioners at 35–36, Baker Botts, 2014 WL 6845689. 
93 Id. at 2169; see also Lubben, Problems With the Supreme Court’s Ruling on Fees, supra note 86 (“[T]he opinion 
does suggest that the Supreme Court does not really understand the dynamics of large Chapter 11 cases.”). 
94 In Re Northshore Mainland Services, Inc., No. 15-11402-KJC (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 14, 2015) (representing official 
committee of creditors); Supplemental Brief In Support of the Application of the Official Committee of Unsecured 
Creditors, In Re Boomerang Tube, LLC, No. 15-11247-MFW, (Bankr. D. Del. June 19, 2015); Fola Akinnibi, 
Kirkland Ch. 11 Fee Bid 'Unreasonable,' US Trustee Says, LAW360 (Nov. 24, 2015, 5:42 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/730906/kirkland-ch-11-fee-bid-unreasonable-us-trustee-says (representing debtors); 
Scott Flaherty, Baker Botts Angles to Shield Future Fees After Asarco Ruling, AM. LAWYER (Dec. 31, 2015), 
http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=1202746109263/Baker-Botts-Angles-to-Shield-Future-Fees-After-Asarco-
Ruling?slreturn=20160024212227 (representing debtors).  
95 11 U.S.C. §§ 328, 330 (2005); see generally, ALAN N. RESNICK & HENRY J. SOMMER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 
¶ 330.03 (16th ed. 2015)  
 
(“Under the Bankruptcy Act, compensation was awarded only upon a quantum meruit basis as determined 
by the court.  Thus, the trustee did not have the power to enter into compensation arrangements with 
professionals employed by the trustee.  Section 328(a) gives to the trustee authority to agree to any 
reasonable compensation arrangements with professional persons.”). 
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section 330 does not include language consenting to fees for defense of fees, section 328 allows 
attorneys to draft contracts with fee defense provisions.96  So long as the court approves  the 
contracts as reasonable, they are valid.97  Under the Supreme Court’s holding in Baker Botts, 
contractual arrangements are an exception to the American Rule.98  
The bankruptcy firms’ stance has been met with some opposition.99  The U.S. Trustee, 
Andrew Vara, has taken the opposing position that such provisions are strictly precluded under 
Baker Botts.100  Furthermore, in the recent opinion for In Re Boomerang, one bankruptcy court for 
the District of Delaware recently determined that Baker Botts forbids such provisions as well.101  
The arguments proclaimed by both the U.S. Trustee and the bankruptcy court for the District of 
Delaware misinterpret both the statutes and precedent, and ignore the market-based policy 
underlying the Code.102 
This Comment argues that courts may approve retention agreements with fee defense 
provisions in compliance with Section 328 and Baker Botts, and that such provisions are 
                                                     
 
96 See, e.g., Supplemental Brief In Support of the Application of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, In 
Re Boomerang Tube, LLC, No. 15-11247-MFW, (Bankr. D. Del. June 19, 2015). 
97 Asarco, L.L.C. v. Barclays Capital, Inc. (In re Asarco, L.L.C.), 702 F.3d 250, 258 (5th Cir. 2012) (asserting that 
contracts approved by the court will be honored unless within a “narrow improvident exception”); COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY, supra note 95, at ¶ 382.02 (“[W]ith court approval, professional persons may be employed on any 
reasonable terms and conditions.”).  
98 Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2164 (2015) (“Our basic point of reference when considering 
the award of attorney's fees is the bedrock principle known as the American Rule: Each litigant pays his own attorney's 
fees, win or lose, unless a statute or contract provides otherwise.” (quoting Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 
560 U. S. 242, 252–53 (2010)). 
99 See, Akinnibi, supra note 94; Jim Christie, Judge Rejects 'Fees on Fees' in Bankruptcy in Wake of Asarco, REUTERS 
(Feb. 2, 2016 6:42 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL2N15H0M4. 
100 United States Trustee’s Supplemental Brief Objecting to Applications For Orders Authorizing the Retention of As 
Co-Counsel For The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, In Re Boomerang Tube, LLC, No. 15-11247-MFW, 
(Bankr. D. Del. June 19, 2015); Akinnibi, supra note 94. 
101 In Re Boomerang Tube, LLC, No. 15-11247-MFW (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 29, 2016). 
102 See generally, 11 U.S.C. § 328, 330 (2005) (representing section 330 and 328 as separate sections, and that section 
330 is subject to 328); Baker Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158 (2015) (holding that statute or 
contract is an exception to the American Rule); 124 Cong. Rec. 32, 394 (1978) (“[T]he policy of [the section] is to 
compensate attorneys and other professionals serving in a case under title 11 at the same rate as the attorney or other 
professional would be compensated for performing comparable services[.]”). 
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imperative to maintaining a market-based bankruptcy system.103  By denying fees for successful 
defense of fees, courts heighten the risk that bankruptcy attorneys’ fees will be diluted, and that 
attorneys will be paid less than non-bankruptcy attorneys in comparable fields.104  Opposing 
counsel will strategically object to fees knowing that the attorneys are in a “no-win” situation.105  
Fee defense provisions under section 328 will guard bankruptcy professionals from fee dilution 
and maintain a fair and just system through court oversight.106  Furthermore, while other solutions 
have been proposed, such as raising fees in general or imposing sanctions on frivolous objections, 
fee defense provisions are the only feasible option under the current bankruptcy system.107 
A. Fee Defense Provisions Under Section 328 Comply with Baker Botts 
1. Baker Botts Does Not Effect Section 328 
 Section 328 is not subject to the Supreme Court’s ruling on section 330.  The court’s ruling 
in Baker Botts was strictly limited to section 330, and nowhere in the opinion was section 328 
mentioned.108  Furthermore, because section 330 does not bind section 328, the opinion has no 
control over contracts made under section 328.109  Prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code 
and the introduction of section 328, private payment agreements were not permissible.110  Since, 
section 328 and section 330 have existed as separate methods of compensation.111  If a court 
approves retention under section 328, fees may not be later altered under section 330 (absent 
                                                     
103 Stephen J. Lubben, Problems With the Supreme Court’s Ruling on Fees, supra note 86. 
104 Brief for Brief For Amici Curiae Bankruptcy Law Scholars in Support of Petitioners, Baker Botts L.L.P. v. Asarco 
LLC, 3-4, 36, 2014 WL 6845689 (U.S., 2014); Springer, supra, note 56 at 539; Lawyers React to Justices’ Ruling in 
Baker Botts Fee Case, LAW360 (June 15, 2015 7:25 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/667772/lawyers-react-to-
justices-ruling-in-baker-botts-fees-case. 
105 Springer, supra note 56 at 539. 
106 See infra § II D. 
107 See infra § II C. 
108 Baker Botts, 2014 WL 6845689. 
109 Bruce A. Markell, Loser’s Lament: Caulkett and ASARCO, 35 No. 8 BANKRUPTCY LAW LETTER NL 1 (2015). 
110 3-328 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY P 328.LH (16th ed.). 
111 Id; 3-330 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY P 330.LH (16th ed.). 
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unforeseen circumstances).112  In fact, the language of section 330 directly states that it is subject 
to section 328, and any mention that section 328 is bound to section 330 is absent from both 
statutes.113  
2. Court Approved Retainer Agreements Are Binding Contracts 
Retainer agreements are contracts.114  However, the U.S. Trustee has argued that a retainer 
agreement made under section 328 is not a contract because it is subject to court approval, and 
therefore cannot serve as an exception to the American Rule.115  This is not accurate.  Under section 
328, an attorney may be employed, with court approval, “on any reasonable terms and conditions 
of employment, including on a retainer.”116  By definition, a retainer agreement is a contract setting 
forth the amount an attorney is to be paid for a certain period of time or certain tasks.117  In fact, 
in recognizing section 328’s binding nature, courts, including the court in In Re Boomerang,118 
have identified that court-approved retainer agreements remain contracts.119  In fact, there are other 
circumstances under the Bankruptcy Code in which agreements may be unilaterally modified or 
approved by courts while still remaining binding contracts.120  Similar to retainer agreements, 
                                                     
112 In re Reimers, 972 F.2d 1127 (9th Cir. 1992); In re Confections by Sandra, Inc., 83 B.R. 729 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
1987); In re Westbrooks, 202 B.R. 520 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996). 
113 11 U.S.C §§ 328, 330 (2005). 
114 7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at Law § 249, (citing McQueen, Rains & Tresch, LLP v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 195 
P.3d 35, 41 (Okla. 2008)) (“A "general retainer agreement" is a contract pursuant to which the client agrees to pay 
the attorney a fixed sum in exchange for an agreed price to cover all legal services arising during a specified 
period.”) (emphasis added). 
115 United States Trustee’s Supplemental Brief Objecting to Applications For Orders Authorizing the Retention of 
As Co-Counsel For The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, 4–7, In Re Boomerang Tube, LLC, No. 15-
11247-MFW, (Bankr. D. Del. June 19, 2015). 
11611 U.S.C. § 328(a) (2005). 
117See Am. Jur., supra note 114. 
118 In Re Boomerang Tube, LLC, No. 15-11247-MFW, 10 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 29, 2016). 
119 In re Merced Falls Ranch, LLC, 2012 WL 8255520, at *4 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2012) (“Once § 328(a)  is 
invoked, the bankruptcy court has limited discretion to vary the contractual terms of that employment.”); U.S. 
Trustee v. Newmark Retail Fin. Advisors LLC (In re Joan & David Helpern, Inc.), No. 00 CIV. 3601 (JSM), 2000 
WL 1800690, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2000). 
120 Direct Press Modern Litho, Inc., 328 NLRB 860, 865 (1999); In re Trump Entm't Resorts, Inc., 519 B.R. 76, 84 
(Bankr. D. Del. 2014), aff'd sub nom. In re Trump Entm't Resorts Unite Here Local 54, No. 14-4807, 2016 WL 
191926 (3d Cir. Jan. 15, 2016); In Re Garofalo's Finer Foods, Inc., 117 B.R. 363, 368–70 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Ill. 1990). 
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bankruptcy courts may alter collective bargaining agreements121 if modifications are found 
necessary and appropriate under the balance of the equities.122  
3. Contracts Under 328 Are Exceptions to the American Rule 
Baker Botts holds that contracts are an exception to the American Rule,123 and if retainer 
agreements are contracts, it naturally follows that they are an exception to the rule.124 Nevertheless, 
the In Re Boomerang court held that a retainer agreement between counsel and the official 
committee of creditors, despite being a valid contract, was not an exception to the American Rule 
because it bound the estate, a third party, to pay.125  The court also asserted that a contract cannot 
bind a non-signing third party.126   
The Delaware bankruptcy court’s holding is weak for two reasons. The first issue is the 
fact that it has one-sided implications.  The estate, which is the entity that funds attorneys’ fees 
and other expenses,127 is still able to contract with its counsel for fee defense provisions.128  It 
would not comport with fairness to allow debtors to reimburse counsel for defense of fee 
applications, but not creditors.129  Second, although a contract cannot bind a non-signing third 
party, the court’s contention will not prohibit fee defense provisions in general; it will only cause 
modifications.130  Given the fact that debtors and creditors alike have sought to include fees for 
defense of fees provisions in their retainer agreements, the simple work-around this opinion is to 
                                                     
121 Collective-Bargaining Agreement, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining a collective bargaining 
agreement as a “contract between an employer and a labor union regulating employment conditions, wages, benefits, 
and grievances”). 
122 Direct Press Modern Litho, Inc., 328 NLRB at 865; see In re Trump Entm't Resorts, Inc., 519 B.R. at 84 
(approving court modifications); In Re Garofalo's Finer Foods, Inc., 117 B.R. at 368–70 (same). 
123 Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2164 (2015) (quoting Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. 
Co., 560 U. S. 242, 252–53 (2010)). 
124 Id. 
125 In Re Boomerang Tube, LLC, No. 15-11247-MFW, 4–5 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 29, 2016). 
126 Markell, supra note 109. 
127 In Re Boomerang Tube, LLC, No. 15-11247-MFW at 4–5 
128 Id. (excluding the debtor or estate from its reasoning). 
129 Id. 
130 Id. (neglecting to consider that debtors and creditors counsel alike will prefer fees for defense of fees). 
 18 
have both parties agree to such contractual provision.131  As further support for the general 
acceptance of fee provision, it should be noted that neither the creditors nor debtors have objected 
to each others’ fee defense provisions, but it is rather the U.S. Trustee who has taken on this role.132  
B. Maintaining a Market Based Bankruptcy Code: Fee Objections and the No-Win Situation 
 
Under the U.S. Trustee’s interpretation of Baker Botts,133 bankruptcy professionals “are 
now being asked to be the volunteer firefighters of the bankruptcy world.  Debtors [and creditors] 
will say, 'Please send the jaws of life, but staff it with volunteers.'”134  Increased fee objections and 
the threat of such objections in negotiations will dilute fees by putting professionals in a no-win 
situation: either defend their fees and eat the costs, or lower their fees to avoid litigation.135  Skilled 
bankruptcy professionals will make the rational choice to work in other areas of law, and once 
such skilled bankruptcy professionals have left the practice, the bankruptcy system and the market 
in general will suffer the consequences.136  Highly successful bankruptcy cases would not exist 
without the talented attorneys who coordinate such reorganizations.137 
                                                     
131 In Re Northshore Mainland Services, Inc., No. 15-11402-KJC (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 14, 2015) (representing 
official committee of creditors); Supplemental Brief In Support of the Application of the Official Committee of 
Unsecured Creditors, In Re Boomerang Tube, LLC, No. 15-11247-MFW, (Bankr. D. Del. June 19, 2015); Fola 
Akinnibi, supra note 94 (representing debtors); Flaherty, supra note 94 (representing debtors). 
132 In Re Northshore Mainland Services, Inc., No. 15-11402-KJC (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 14, 2015) (objecting U.S. 
Trustee) Supplemental Brief In Support of the Application of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, In Re 
Boomerang Tube, LLC, No. 15-11247-MFW, (Bankr. D. Del. June 19, 2015) (objecting U.S. Trustee); Akinnibi, 
supra, note 94 (objecting U.S. Trustee); Scott Flaherty, supra note 94 (objecting U.S. Trustee). 
133 Id. 
134 Lawyers React To Justices' Ruling In Baker Botts Fees Case, supra note 104. 
135 See Brief for Former Bankruptcy Judges Leif M. Clark and Judith K. Fitzgerald as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners, Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 2014 WL 7166533 (U.S.), 13 (U.S.,2014); Chambers v. NASCO, 
Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 53 (1991).   
136 Brief For Amici Curiae Bankruptcy Law Scholars in Support of Petitioners, Baker Botts, 2014 WL 6845689; 
Brief for Former Bankruptcy Judges Leif M. Clark and Judith K. Fitzgerald as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners, Baker Botts, 2014 WL 7166533; Amicus Curiae Brief of the State Bar of Texas Bankruptcy Law Section 
in Support of Petitioners, Baker Botts, 2014 WL 7145502. 
137 See, e.g., Harvey R. Miller & Maurice Horwitz, Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, The Lehman Brothers Saga: 
International Issues and Conflicts, http://www.stern.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/assets/documents/con_041232.pdf. 
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Increased fee objections will dilute the fees of bankruptcy professionals.138  Bankruptcy 
professional fees are frequently litigated,139 and if bankruptcy professionals receive no exceptions 
to the American Rule, objections and any subsequent litigation will only increase.140  In a 2004 
based study conducted by the American Bankruptcy Institute, parties objected to the lead debtor 
attorney fees in 10% of chapter 11 cases.141  In large chapter 11 cases, party objections doubled to 
20%.142  As will be discussed infra, bad faith sanctions such as Rule 9011 and § 1927 have little 
to no deterrence on unmeritorious fee objections.  Disgruntled creditors and debtors alike will use 
this as an opportunity to commence scorched earth campaigns against professionals under the false 
guise of good faith.143  
Fee dilution is not limited to the bankruptcy profession and exceptions to the American 
Rule have been commonly recognized in other areas of law as well.144  The Ninth Circuit, fearing 
fee dilution for bankruptcy professionals, compared the situation to other statutorily authorized 
fees.145  If an attorney is required to spend time litigating fee applications at self-cost, the attorney’s 
effective rate for the hours spent on the case will shrink, and as a result attorneys will take less 
cases with statutorily authorized fees, such as Title VII, civil rights cases, or bankruptcy cases.146  
In addition, the effective rate for bankruptcy professionals is at even greater risk than civil rights 
                                                     
138 Id. 
139 Amicus Curiae Brief of the State Bar of Texas Bankruptcy Law Section in Support of Petitioners, Baker Botts 
L.L.P. v. Asarco LLC, 19 n. 18, 2014 WL 7145502 (2014).  
140 Id. at 18–21. 
141 Id. at 20–21. 
142 Id. 
143 Robert J. Keach, Bankruptcy Experts Discuss Supreme Court's Ruling in Baker Botts LLP v. ASARCO LLC and 
the Impact on Professional Fees, Bankruptcy Litigation, AM. BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE (June 18, 2015), 
http://www.abi.org/educational-brief/bankruptcy-experts-discuss-supreme-courts-ruling-in-baker-botts-llp-v-asarco-
llc; see, e.g. In re Kendavis Indus. Int'l, Inc., 91 B.R 742 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988) (engaging in a scorched earth 
campaign). 
144 In re Nucorp Energy, Inc., 764 F.2d 655, 660 (9th Cir. 1985). 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
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attorneys because a longer list of parties may object to bankruptcy fees.147  The debtor, a trustee, 
a creditor, an equity security holder, any indenture trustee, or any other party of interest may 
contest a debtor or creditor’s attorney fees—or, in the case of Baker Botts, even a scorned parent 
company that the law firm sued on behalf of the debtor.”148 
The license to make threats of objections may be an even stronger source of fee dilution 
that the objections themselves.149  The intimidation of the court’s oversight may sometimes hinder 
bad faith or unmeritorious objections in court, but court oversight does not extend to objections in 
negotiations.150  Robert Keach, co-chair of the Chapter 11 Reform Commission, explains that an 
objector, such as ASARCO, can make a law firm, such as Baker Botts, “spend in excess of its 
bonus to defend its bonus.  It’s a powerful threat to make—whether it is from creditors or 
debtors.”151  The power of the threats will come from their newfound credibility.152  If an objection 
is made, it is now more than likely that the bankruptcy professional will eat the cost of defending 
the objection.153  As the District of Delaware court recognized, “‘creditors could negotiate 
reductions in these fee awards knowing full well that the attorney is in a no-win situation.  Even if 
the attorney prevails, he or she will in effect have financed the litigation without any hope of 
surviving it whole.’”154  
                                                     
147 11 USC §1109. 
148 11 USC §1109; Brief for Petitioners, Baker Botts L.L.P. v. Asarco LLC, 2014 WL 6845689 (U.S.), 8–13 (U.S., 
2014). 
149 See Lubben, Problems With Supreme Court’s Ruling on Fees, supra note 86; Robert J. Keach, Bankruptcy Experts 
Discuss Supreme Court's Ruling in Baker Botts LLP v. ASARCO LLC and the Impact on Professional Fees, 
Bankruptcy Litigation, AM. BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE (June 18, 2015), http://www.abi.org/educational-
brief/bankruptcy-experts-discuss-supreme-courts-ruling-in-baker-botts-llp-v-asarco-llc. 
150 Id. 
151 Keach, supra note 149. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 In re Worldwide Direct Inc., 334 B.R. 108, 111 (D. Del. 2005) (quoting In re Big Rivers Electric Corp., 252 B.R. 
670, 675 (W.D. Ky. 2000)). 
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As Congress feared, if bankruptcy professionals are paid less than their non-bankruptcy 
counterparts, there will be less incentive to engage in bankruptcy practice.155  Currently, almost 
every elite law firm has a bankruptcy practice.156  But there was a time, when bankruptcy 
professionals were compensated based on the economy of the estate, “when bankruptcy law 
practice was not well regarded and was considered by most firms as unseemly.”157  Under such a 
system, skilled attorneys had no interest in joining the bankruptcy practice because “no money 
could be made without very hard labor, and it [was] only by volume of work that one may [have] 
hope[d] to acquire a competence.”158  Bankruptcy was, and still is, a very complicated system, so 
talented young attorneys will have little incentive to join such a difficult practice if they know they 
will be more fairly compensated in another corporate area.159  
“Compensation is the lubricant which makes the bankruptcy machinery work,”160 but if 
bankruptcy professionals are not compensated at market rate, the machinery may no longer 
work.161  Skilled bankruptcy professionals have benefited creditors and debtors alike by finding 
ways to decrease losses to the estate, save jobs, and pay creditors.162  If bankruptcy is left to “those 
                                                     
155 11 U.S.C.A. § 330 (1978); H.R. REP. 95-595, 30, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6286; see also 124 Cong. Rec. 32, 394 
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157 GROSS, supra note 35 at 152; see, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, The Demographics of Bankruptcy Practice, 63 AM. 
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1987, at 31. 
158 Reuben G. Hunt, A Defense of Attorneys’ Fees in Bankruptcy Proceedings, v.35 issue 10 Commercial Law 
Journal 630, 631 (Oct. 1930).   
159 See Problems With Supreme Court’s Ruling on Fees, supra note 86. 
160 Matter of King Res. Co., 651 F.2d 1349, 1352 (10th Cir. 1981). 
161 Stephen J. Lubben, Review Essay: Chapter 11 as Intrigue-- Professional Fees in Corporate Bankruptcies: Data, 
Analysis, and Evaluation Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, 28 B.F.L.R. 171, 185 (Nov. 2012). 
162 Stewart Bishop, Lehman Brothers Creditors Getting $2.2B Payout, LAW360, (Feb. 19, 2015, 6:42 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/623015/lehman-brothers-creditors-getting-2-2b-payout; Trefis Team, Relaunching 
American Airlines's Coverage: Exiting Bankruptcy Into A Successful Turnaround Has Added Value, FORBES (May 
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who could not find other work and those who practice bankruptcy only occasionally almost as a 
public service,”163 the new rank of attorneys representing debtors and creditors may mistakenly 
take action, or not take action, in such a way that is damning to the estate.164   Creditors will realize 
that the likelihood of receiving recoveries from a bankrupt estate has dwindled, and will 
consequently raise borrowing costs.165   
C. Rejecting Alternatives: Why Section 328 Fee Defense Provisions Are Superior to Other 
Options 
 
The additional solutions have been proposed to fix the fee dilution problem: (1) Rule 9011 
sanctions against offending attorneys, firms, or parties who bring an fee objection that is frivolous 
or improper;166 (2) §1927 sanctions against attorneys for vexatious or improper conduct in bringing 
a fee objection;167 and (3) fee padding.168  One may also argue that this is a problem best dealt with 
by Congress, but given the current state of affairs, the reality of the situation has tapped the 
judiciary with responsibility.169  The remainder of this Comment will analyze the three possible 
                                                     
12, 2014, 01:36 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2014/05/12/relaunching-american-airliness-
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169 The Baker Botts v. Asarco Fallout Has Begun, LAW360 (Sep. 1, 2015 2:59 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/697291/the-baker-botts-v-asarco-fallout-has-begun  
 
(“Bankruptcy practitioners trying to ensure undiluted payment of debtors’ counsel may seek to return to the 
pre-Asarco fee structure by lobbying Congress to insert into Section 330(a) express language authorizing 
payment of fees incurred in resolving fee disputes.  This request could be framed as a follow-up to the recent 
American Bankruptcy Institute Commission Report, which did not address this particular issue.  The 
problem with this approach is that Congress, which has yet to act on the ABI Commission Report and is not 
likely to undertake much needed reform of the code anytime soon, is almost certain to do nothing in 
response.”); 
 
 but see Lawyers React to Justices’ Ruling in Baker Botts Fee Case, supra note 104 (“Of course, if Congress wanted 
to clarify that the Bankruptcy Court has the discretion to award compensation for the defense of a fee application, it 
would be easy to amend Section 330 to expressly so provide.”). 
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alternatives to section 328, and will prove that contractual provisions are the best-suited solution 
for bankruptcy law. 
1. Fee Padding 
Some professionals have suggested that the proper way to counteract fee dilution caused 
by meritless fees objections is to set attorneys fees at a higher price.170  Aside from the fact that a 
rate padding scheme would put the cost of meritless fee objections posed by the few on the whole, 
such a scheme is not possible under the Code’s transparency requirements,171 current case law,172 
or the U.S. Trustee Guidelines.173  
Bankruptcy courts hold that “the hourly rates of bankruptcy practitioners must be 
commensurate with the hourly rates charged by their peers in other practice areas.”174  If a firm 
were to raise its hourly rate for bankruptcy work, then the bankruptcy court would compare such 
fees to its work in non-bankruptcy proceedings, note that the bankruptcy rate is higher, and hold 
that that the bankruptcy rate does not comply with the code.175  In addition, the U.S. Trustee does 
not allow attorneys to engage in rate padding.176  Despite concerns regarding fee dilution, the U.S. 
Trustee has maintained the guideline requirement that firms be paid the general hourly rate charged 
                                                     
170 Transcript of Oral Argument at 23, (No. 14-103) Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, (Justice Scalia) (suggesting 
that “lawyer's fees are set at a high enough level...that they take into account the fact that sometimes you will have to 
litigate to get the fees”). 
171 Amicus Curiae Brief of the State Bar of Texas Bankruptcy Law Section in Support of Petitioners, at 18. 
172 In re Fleming Companies, Inc., 304 B.R. 85, 93 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003). 
173 Appendix B Guidelines for Reviewing Applications for Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses Filed 
Under United States Code by Attorneys in Larger Chapter 11 Cases, 78 Fed. Reg. 116, 36248–36276 (June 17, 
2013). 
174 In re Fleming Companies, Inc., 304 B.R. at 93. 
175 See id.; Brief for Former Bankruptcy Judges Leif M. Clark and Judith K. Fitzgerald as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Petitioners, 11–12, Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 2014 WL 7166533 (U.S. 2014) 
176 Appendix B Guidelines for Reviewing Applications for Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses Filed 
Under United States Code by Attorneys in Larger Chapter 11 Cases, 78 Fed. Reg. 116, 36248–36276 (June 17, 
2013); Amicus Curiae Brief of the State Bar of Texas Bankruptcy Law Section in Support of Petitioners, 18, Baker 
Botts L.L.P. v. Asarco LLC, 2014 WL 7145502 (U.S., 2014) (citing 78 F.R. 36248-02, 2013 WL 2902995 (F.R.), at 
*36255 (June 17, 2013) (“[S]uch risk-adjusted higher fees may well run afoul of the recently implemented United 
States Trustee Guidelines that require evidence that rates charged are not higher merely because the case arose in 
bankruptcy.”)). 
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for non-bankruptcy proceedings.177  The bankruptcy system requires fee applications to be 
transparent and detailed breakdowns of rates.178  If rates are padded, the system will be undermined 
because attorneys cannot honestly account for the generally increased fees when the number of fee 
defenses will vary from case to case.179   
2. Rule 9011 
The majority opinion in Bakers Botts suggests that Rule 9011, the bankruptcy version of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, will provide a sufficient deterrent against frivolous claims.180 
Rule 9011 sanctions attorneys for bad faith litigation conduct, including attorney’s fees that 
occurred as a result of the conduct.181  Rule 9011 may protect against frivolous objections in theory, 
but in practicality, it will be an insufficient guard against fee dilution because it is rarely brought 
up and executed.182  
Rule 9011 is rarely used in bankruptcy courts, and even when raised, its standard is too 
high to make any real impact on fee dilution.183  Courts demand “exceptional circumstances where 
a claim is patently unmeritorious or frivolous”184 so that the “very temple of justice has been 
defiled.”185 If courts must exercise “restraint” and “discretion” at the level the law demands,186 
                                                     
177Appendix B Guidelines, supra note 176, at 36251–53, 66.  
178 Amicus Curiae Brief of the State Bar of Texas Bankruptcy Law Section in Support of Petitioners, 18, Baker Botts 
L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 2014 WL 7166533 (U.S. 2014). 
179 Id. 
180 Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2168 (2015). 
181 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011 (1997). 
182 Lubben, Problems With Supreme Court’s Ruling on Fees, supra note 86 (“There is a good deal of space between 
and objection that is made in bad faith and one that is actually ‘sanctionable’ under the rules.”). 
183 Brief for Former Bankruptcy Judges Leif M. Clark and Judith K. Fitzgerald as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners, Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 13, 2014 WL 7166533 (U.S. 2014) (“The standard for imposing 
sanctions is too high for bankruptcy judges to prevent dilution with that rarely used cudgel.”) (emphasis added). 
184 In re 15375 Mem'l Corp., 430 B.R. 142, 150 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010) 
185 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46 (1991). 
186 Id. at 44. 
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even the list of meritless objections in Baker Botts would not meet such a criteria.187  Thus, the 
patent bad faith necessary for rule 9011 sanctions will hardly meet most meritless fee objections. 
The first case published since Baker Botts illustrates that Rule 9011 is a useless tool against 
fee dilution.  In In re River Rd. Hotel Partners, LLC, the Bankruptcy Court of the Northern District 
of Illinois determined that, despite a “scorched earth campaign” of objections against the fee 
application,188 which was met to no avail both in the trial court and on appeal,189 attorney fee 
sanctions were not warranted.190  The court stated that “[t]he standards for bad faith are necessarily 
stringent, and [a] party should not be penalized for maintaining an aggressive litigation posture.”191  
The court furthermore reasoned that the objector “acted to protect its interests,” and given the fees 
at stake, “did not commit a fraud upon the Court, nor did it defile the “very temple of justice.”192  
It must be reminded that in large bankruptcy cases, fees will always come with a price because of 
the case’s inherent size and complexity.193  Objectors will continue to object in self-interest, 
whether it is by a scorched earth campaign or a justified pursuit, but it is in the interest of the 
profession and estates to minimize fee dilution.194  
In addition to objections by parties, fee applications are also subject to objections by the 
court itself.  In such instances, Rule 9011 provides no instrument to combat fee dilution at all.195 
Take this hypothetical, proposed by former Bankruptcy Judges Clark and Fitzgerald, for example: 
                                                     
187 In re ASARCO LLC, No. 05-21207, 2011 WL 2974957  (Bankr. S.D. Tex. July 20, 2011) aff'd in part, rev'd in 
part and remanded, 477 B.R. 661 (S.D. Tex. 2012). 
188 In re River Rd. Hotel Partners, LLC, 536 B.R. 228, 243 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2015) 
189 In re River Rd. Partners, LLC, No. 09 B 30029, 2012 WL 6585506, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Dec. 17, 2012) aff'd in 
part, rev'd in part sub nom. FBR Capital Markets & Co. v. Bletchley Hotel at O'Hare LLC, No. 09 B 30029, 2013 
WL 5408848 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 2013) remand to In re River Rd. Partners, LLC, 520 B.R. 691 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
2014) reconsideration denied, 536 B.R. 228 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2015). 
190 Id. at 244 
191 In re River Rd. Hotel Partners, LLC, 536 B.R. 228, 244 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2015) (citing Fortune v. Taylor Fortune 
Grp., L.L.C., No. 15-60009, 2015 WL 4624211, at *3 (5th Cir. Aug. 4, 2015)). 
192 Id. at 244 (quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 42 (1991)). 
193 KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS 152 (1997). 
194 See id. 
195 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011 (1997) (sanctioning attorneys’ fees on attorneys, not the courts). 
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Suppose the bankruptcy judge, acting sua sponte under Section 330(a)(2), flags a 
perceived problem with the professional's fee application.  The professional prepares a 
response, at some nontrivial cost, and the bankruptcy judge is ultimately persuaded to 
award fees as originally requested by the application.  Nobody has done anything wrong 
here.  To the contrary, the process is precisely what the Bankruptcy Code requires . . . . 
The bankruptcy judge certainly will not sanction himself, so . . . the professional [will be 
forced] to bear the bankruptcy-specific cost of defending her successful application. That 
cannot be right[.]196 
 
Rule 9011, while an available tool, is not a sufficient solution to fee dilution on its own.  If 
it were, fee objections would increase given the lack of consequences imposed by rule 9011, and 
attorneys would be disincentivized to practice in bankruptcy, leaving the estates to the lack of 
skilled workforce from days past.197 
3. Section 1927 
 
It has been suggested that Section 1927 will provide a more adequate solution to the fee dilution 
problem.198  However, Section 1927, just like Rule 9011, will not solve the fee dilution problem.  
Section 1927 declares that any attorney who  “multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably 
and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the . . . attorneys’ fees reasonably 
incurred because of such conduct.”199  While the statute would theoretically sanction attorneys fees 
for “unreasonable and vexatious” objections, in practical application, the statute will not be 
effective or even applicable to bankruptcy proceedings.200  
The primary issue with Section 1927 is the fact that circuits are split on whether bankruptcy 
courts may even impose the sanctions at all.201  Even if a bankruptcy court allows for 1927 
                                                     
196 Brief for Former Bankruptcy Judges Leif M. Clark and Judith K. Fitzgerald as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners, Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 2014 WL 7166533 (U.S.), 14 (2014). 
197 See Richard I. Aaron, The Bankruptcy Bench, 89 COM. L.J. 47, 47 (1984); see also Harold Lavien, Fees As Seen 
From The Bankruptcy Bench, 89 COM. L.J. 136, 136 (1984). 
198 Robert J. Keach, Bankruptcy Experts Discuss Supreme Court's Ruling in Baker Botts LLP v. ASARCO LLC. 
199 28 U.S.C.A. § 1927 (West).  
200 See supra, page 24–26 (discussing problems with Rule 9011). 
201 Compare In re Schaefer Salt Recovery, Inc., 542 F.3d 90 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding a bankruptcy court has the 
power to impose sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927), with In re Courtesy Inns, Ltd., Inc., 40 F.3d 1084, 1086 (10th 
Cir. 1994) (“A bankruptcy court is not a “court of the United States” and therefore cannot impose sanctions under 28 
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sanctions, the standard of persuasion is just as high, if not higher, than what is necessary for Rule 
9011 sanctions.202  As the bankruptcy court reminded in In Re River, “[s]anctions, under any 
authority, are the exception, not the norm, and should not be imposed lightly, ‘even in the face of 
aggressive litigation tactics and strategy.’”203  In addition, scholars have suggested that the burden 
of proof under 1927 is more demanding than the burden of proof under 9011(a).204  In some 
jurisdictions, such as the Second Circuit, sanctions are declined  “absent both ‘clear evidence’ that 
the challenged actions ‘are entirely without color, and [are taken] for reasons of harassment or 
delay or for other improper purposes’” and “a high degree of specificity in the factual findings of 
[the] lower courts.”205  Thus, Section 1927 is just as, if not more, unreliable and inefficient as a 
tool against fee dilution as Rule 9011. 
D. The Viable Option: Fee Defense Provisions Are Reasonable Under Section 328 
Attorney Fee provisions are reasonable under 328, and should therefore be granted by 
courts.  The bankruptcy court of the District of Delaware and the Third Circuit have listed five 
non-limiting factors to determine the reasonableness of terms and conditions under § 328: (1) 
whether the terms of the retention agreement reflect normal business terms; (2) the relationship 
between the debtors and the professionals; (3) whether the retention agreement is in the best 
interest of the estate; (4) whether the creditor opposes the retention agreement; (5) the reasonability 
                                                     
U.S.C. § 1927.”); In re Sandoval, 186 B.R. 490 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995) (holding bankruptcy court is not "court of the 
United States."), Matter of Volpert, 110 F.3d 494, 499 (7th Cir. 1997) (declining to determine if bankruptcy courts 
can impose sanctions under 28 U.S.C. §1927). 
202 Carlos J. Cuevas, Vexatious Tactics Judicial Code 1927 and Bankruptcy Attorneys Part I, ABI JOURNAL (Aug. 
1998), http://www.abi.org/abi-journal/vexatious-tactics-judicial-code-1927-and-bankruptcy-attorneyspart-i. 
203 In re River Rd. Hotel Partners, LLC, 536 B.R. 228, 243 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2015) (citing Kramer v. Mahia (In re 
Khan), 488 B.R. 515, 528 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.2013), aff'd sub nom. Dahiya v. Kramer, No. 13–CV–3079 (DLI), 2014 
WL 1278131 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2014), aff'd, 593 Fed.Appx. 83 (2d Cir. 2015). 
204 Cuevas, supra note 202. 
205 Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1272 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing Dow Chemical Pacific Ltd., 782 F.2d at 344); see 
also In re Smith, BR 896-80189-478, 2011 WL 222146, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2011) (sanctions were a “close call” 
but the court declined to sanction under 28 U.S.C. §1927 where it could not “state with certainty that Appellants acted 
in bad faith”). 
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of the price and level of risk minimization.206  The fifth factor, reasonability of the price, can be 
supplemented by the Johnson factors from section 330—most notably, “whether the compensation 
is reasonable based on the customary compensation charged by comparably skilled practitioners 
in cases other than cases under this title.”207  This section will demonstrate why engagement 
agreements granting compensation for successfully defending fee applications meet all five factors 
of the Delaware test. 
1. Defense Fees Are Part of the Normal Market Place 
The provision would reflect normal business terms in the market place because it would 
maintain the way the modern bankruptcy system has operated itself and would replicate accepted 
practice in other fields of law.  In the bankruptcy market, the majority of courts have allowed for 
compensation for successful fee defenses.208  In fact, courts in nineteen states have awarded 
                                                     
206 In re Insilco Technologies, Inc., 291 B.R. 628, 634 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) (citing United Artists Theatre Co. v. 
Walton, 315 F.3d 217, 238 n. 4 (3d Cir. 2003)). 
207 11 U.S.C. § 330 (1994) (emphasis added). 
208 Supplemental Brief In Support of the Application of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, In Re 
Boomerang Tube, LLC, no. 15-11247-MFW (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 17, 2015) (listing, “California: See In re GFI 
Commercial Mortg. LLP, 2013 WL 4647300 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2013); In re DIMAS, LLC, 357 B.R. 563 (Bankr. 
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Ranch, LLC, 2013 WL 3155448 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. June 20, 2013); In re Shalan Enters., LLC, 2012 WL 1345328 
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2012); In re Schneider, 2008 WL 4447092 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2008); In re 
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Commc’ns Sys., Inc., 2006 WL 2711752 (Bankr. D. Conn. Sept. 21, 2006). Georgia: See In re Concrete Prods., Inc., 
1993 WL 13726054 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. July 27, 1993). Hawaii: See In re Kahuku Hosp., 2011 WL 5884144 (Bankr. D. 
Haw. Nov. 23, 2011). Illinois: See In re Churchfield Mgmt. & Inv. Corp., 98 B.R. 838 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989); In re 
Chicago Lutheran Hosp. Ass’n, 89 B.R. 719 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988). Kentucky: See Big Rivers Elec. Corp. v. Schilling 
(In re Big Rivers Elec. Corp.), 252 B.R. 670 (W.D. Ky. 2000); In re Atwell, 148 B.R. 483 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1993). 
Massachusetts: See In re Lupo, 2012 WL 1682571 (Bankr. D. Mass. May 14, 2012). Michigan: See In re Wiczorek, 
2013 WL 1120019 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 17, 2013); Boyd v. Engman, 404 B.R. 467 (W.D. Mich. 2009); In re Moss, 320 
B.R. 143 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2005). New Mexico: See In re First State Bancorporation, 2014 WL 1203141 (Bankr. 
D.N.M. Mar. 24, 2014). New York: See In re Quigley Co., Inc., 500 B.R. 347 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013); In re CCT 
Commc’ns, Inc., 2010 WL 3386947 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2010). North Carolina: See In re Downs & Assocs., 
Ltd., 2002 WL 32139302 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. Dec. 11, 2002). Oklahoma: See In re Millennium Multiple Emp’r Welfare 
Benefit Plan, 470 B.R. 203 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 2012). Oregon: See In re Smith, 2008 WL 2852263 (Bankr. D. Or. 
July 23, 2008). Pennsylvania: See In re Bible Deliverance Evangelistic Church, 39 B.R. 768 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984). 
Utah: See In re Ricci Inv. Co., Inc., 217 B.R. 901 (D. Utah 1998); In re CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 131 B.R. 
474 (Bankr. D. Utah 1991). Vermont: See In re S.T.N. Enters. Inc., 70 B.R. 823 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1987). Virginia: See 
Goodbar v. Beskin, 2013 WL 1249124 (W.D. Va. Mar. 26, 2013); Nunley v. Jessee, 92 B.R. 152 (W.D. Va. 1988). 
Wisconsin: See In re Hutter Constr. Co., 126 B.R. 1005 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1991).” Supplemental Brief In Support of 
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attorney’s fees for successfully defending fee applications.209  Furthermore, despite the fact that 
328 provisions were not necessary for successful defense costs under section 330, some courts 
approved such provisions regardless.210  Even outside of sections 330 and 328, courts have 
awarded defense fees in debtor-in-possession financing orders.211  Even outside of bankruptcy law, 
where attorneys are not subject to as much fee dilution, engagement agreements with provisions 
contracting for similar attorneys fees have been approved.212  Thus, fees for defense of fees 
provision would reflect normal business terms both in and outside of bankruptcy. 
2. Sophisticated Parties 
The relationship between the debtors and professionals generally indicate that retention 
agreements are reasonable because both parties to the agreements tend to be sophisticated with 
equal bargaining power.213  This will be especially true in large Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases in 
                                                     
the Application of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, In Re Boomerang Tube, LLC, no. 15-11247-MFW 
(Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 17, 2015).  
209 Id. 
210 See, e.g., In re Potter, 377 B.R. 305, 308 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2007). 
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12596(KJC) (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 26, 2014) (Docket No. 70); In re AWI Delaware, Inc., Case No. 14-12092(KJC) 
(Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 10, 2014) (Docket No. 58). 
212 Supplemental Brief in Support of Committee Retention Apps, Boomerang Tube LLC, No. 14-11247 (Aug. 17, 
2015) (citing Calvo Fisher & Jacob LLP v. Lujan, 184 Cal. Rptr. 3d 225 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015)); Lockton v. O’Rourke, 
109 Cal. Rptr. 392 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010); Opinion 2009-2 of the Delaware State Bar Association Committee on 
Professional Ethics at 4.10 (“The Committee sees no legal impediment to a fee shifting provision in an engagement 
or retainer letter.  Further, the Committee is of the opinion that there is no professional ethical impediment to a valid 
fee shifting provision in the client agreement.”); Opinion 310 of the District Of Columbia's Bar Legal Ethics 
Committee, http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/ethics/legal_ethics/opini ons/opinion310.cfin (permitting engagement 
letters with costs of collection provisions); see Carey Rodriguez Greenberg & Paul, LLP v. Arminak, 583 F. Supp. 2d 
1288 (S.D. Fla. 2008); Gossett & Gossett, PA v. Mervolion, 941 So. 2d 1207 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Berryer v. 
Hertz, 522 So. 2d 510 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); see Burds v. Hipes, 763 S.E.2d 887 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014); Timothy 
Whelan Law Associates, Ltd. v. Kruppe, 947 N.E.2d 366, 370 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011); Payne Broder & Fossee, P.C., v. 
Shefman, 2014 WL 3612699 (Mich. Ct. App. July 22, 2014); Order Authorizing Employment and Retention of Arent 
Fox PLLC as Counsel for the Debtors, 240 Church Street Operating Co. II, LLC, No. 04-14388 (RDD) (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2004), D.I. 62, supra; King & Ballow v. MaineToday Media, Inc., 2012 WL 4192522 (M.D. Tenn. 
Sept. 19, 2012); Virginia Legal Ethics Opinion No. 1667 (permits engagement letters with costs of collection 
provisions); Leen v. Demopolis, 815 P.2d 269, 276 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991)). 
213 Id. 
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which creditors and debtors are sizeable and sophisticated organizations with their own in-house 
counsel.214  
3. Fee Defense Provisions Are in the Best Interest of Estates 
The retention agreements will be in the best interest of estates under the same market based 
policy reasoning the majority of courts maintained for section 330 prior to Baker Botts.215  While 
it may be argued that Baker Botts eliminated any such policy arguments,216 Baker Botts was 
decided based on the statutory text, which does not negate the importance of the market-based 
approach.217  Similar to courts granting defense fees, retention agreements will minimize fee 
dilution and will ensure that bankruptcy cases will be handled by skilled professionals, ultimately 
protecting estates from higher costs.218  When professionals, without the security of defense fees, 
face objections to their fee applications, they are put in a no-win situation for which there is no 
viable solution.219  If professionals are not granted attorney’s fees for successfully defending fee 
applications, there is a risk that attorney’s fees in general will rise, adding unnecessary costs to the 
estate.220  If such costs do not rise, then the highly skilled professionals who make the system work 
will not be compensated in parity with their non-bankruptcy counterparts.221  Bankruptcy attorneys 
will be forced to join practice elsewhere, leaving the fate of the estate to volunteers and those who 
                                                     
214 See, e.g., In Re Northshore Mainland Services, Inc. No. 15-11402-KJC (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 14, 2015); In Re 
Boomerang Tube, LLC, No. 15-11247-MFW (Bankr. D. Del. June 19, 2015). 
215 See supra ?, at 9–11. 
216 See U.S. Trustee’s Supplemental Brief Objecting to Application, In Re Boomerang Tube, LLC, No. 15-11247-
MFW, (Bankr. D. Del. June 19, 2015). 
217 Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158 (2015). 
218 See supra page 9–11.  
219 Springer, supra note 56, at 539. 
220 Transcript of Oral Argument at 23, (No. 14-103) Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC (Justice Scalia) 
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221 See Brief for Former Bankruptcy Judges Leif M. Clark and Judith K. Fitzgerald as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners, Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 13, 2014 WL 7166533 (U.S., 2014); Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 
501 U.S. 32, 53 (1991). 
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could not otherwise find employment.222  Ultimately, all parties will suffer from a lack of skilled 
representation.223 
4. Creditors Will Not Oppose the Provision 
Creditor opposition will be of little issue in regards to defense fee provisions because 
creditors are just as likely as debtors to apply for fee defense provisions.224  The effects of such 
agreements are mutually beneficial for both parties, so it is unlikely that either parties’ defense fee 
provisions will objected by anyone other than the U.S. Trustee or the court.225 
5. Reasonable Fees with Built-In Risk Minimization 
Lastly, the provision is reasonable and provides the correct level of risk minimization.  
Under the Johnson Factors, it is the general policy of the Code to compensate attorneys in parity 
with their non-bankruptcy counterparts.  As discussed above, professionals’ fees will be diluted to 
the point where they are compensated less than other attorneys in similar circumstances.  Under 
the pre-2015 bankruptcy system, which generally included defense fees, bankruptcy attorneys 
were paid the same as, if not less than, other corporate attorneys.226  If fees are generally diluted, 
then they, as a whole, will be paid even less.  As demonstrated above, Rule 9011 and Section 1927 
are inadequate barriers to fee dilution, and fee padding is impermissible under the law.  The fee 
defense provisions are further reasonable because of court oversight, which mitigates the risk of 
attorneys filing frivolous fee requests under the expectation that they will be objected to, adding 
                                                     
222 H.R. REP. 95-595, 30, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6286. 
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226 Stephen Lubben, The Direct Costs of Corporate Reorganization: An Empirical Examination of Professional Fees 
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up defense fees to charge the estate.227  Courts have the power to modify the terms of the agreement 
and limit fees to successful defenses and reasonable amounts.228  
  
                                                     
227 See 11 U.S.C. §328 (2005) (requiring court oversight). 
228 In re Riverside-Linden Inv. Co., 945 F.2d 320, 323 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting In re Riverside-Linden Inv. Co., 111 
B.R. 298, 301 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1990); Brief for Former Bankruptcy Judges Leif M. Clark and Judith K. Fitzgerald as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Baker Botts L.L.P. v. Asarco LLC, 11-12, 2014 WL 7166533 (U.S., 2014) 
(“A bankruptcy judge who has discretion to award reasonable defense fees is not bound to do so at the request of a 
professional with ‘perverse incentives.’  The bankruptcy judge can always say no.”) (citing Comm’r v. Jean, 496 
U.S. 154, 163 (1990) (“Exorbitant, unfounded, or procedurally defective fee applications . . . are matters that the 
[judge] can recognize and discount.”); In re S. Cal. Sunbelt Developers, Inc., 608 F.3d 456, 463 n.2 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(“[W]e reject [the] contention that permitting recovery of fees on fees fosters a ‘lottery mentality’ and invites 
debtors to engage in excessive fee litigation.”). 
 
